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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
DOX JESSE REAL, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An information charging Don Jesse Neal with the 
crime of murder in the first degree was filed on June 
23, 1951 (R. 10). A motion to dismiss the information 
charging defendant with first degree murder was filed 
on October 15, 1951, alleging as grounds for dismissal 
of the information that the State failed to prove on the 
preliminary hearing that the crime charged in such in-
formation was a willful, deliberate, malicious, and pre-
meditated killing. The motion was, by the court, over-
ruled (R. 17) and a plea of not guilty entered by the 
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The Jury was duly impanelled and sworn to try the 
case (R. 33) and the State proceeded to offer testimony 
in support of the charges of first degree murder as 
alleged in the information. Such testimony disclosed 
that on the 23rd day of May, 1951, at about two o'clock 
P.M. the defendant, Wilma Lenoma Tully and Officer 
Owen T. Farley were proceeding north on the east side 
of State Street immediately north of the intersection of 
Third South Street in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, in a DeSoto sedan automobile driven by Owen T. 
Farley, the defendant and \Vilma Lenoma Tully hav-
ing been taken into custody by Officer Farley a few mo-
ments before at or near the east entrance on State Street 
to Auerbach's Department Store. As the automobile 
proceeded north on State Street and across the inter-
section at Third South and immediately in front of No. 
261 South State Street at which place the automobile 
collided with a parked automobile and immediately prior 
to such collision a shot was heard. Officer Farley was 
found lying on the street. Wilma Lenoma Tully left the 
scene by the right hand door of the automobile and was 
later apprehended at Wendover, Utah. The defendant 
left the automobile from the opposite side and was later 
apprehended several blocks from the scene. Officer Far-
ley was removed to the hospital and died several hours 
later. 
Dr. Milton Pepper testified that he attended and 
examined CJfficer Farley upon his arrival at Holy Cross 
Hospital on May 23, 1951; that he found a penetrating 
wound of the abdomen to the right of the navel and an 
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exit wound in the back to the left of the middle just above 
the hip and from such wound Officer Farley died about 
3:45 P.ili., ~lay 23, 1951 (R. 36-37). Dr. John Marshall, 
Assistant City Physician, testifed that he performed an 
autopsy on the body of Officer Farley May 25, 1951, and 
in his opinion the officer died from excessive loss of 
blood; that he found a perforating wound in the abdo-
men measuring 1%" in diameter, the point of entry 
being 2" above the navel and 1" to the right of the 
middle line, the point of exit 2" to the left of the middle 
line at the level of the second lumbar vertebra; that in 
his opinion the missile that entered Officer Farley's 
body went straight through and came out the back and 
that the gun that fired the shot was pointed directly at 
Officer Farley (R. 41-43). 
Officer Hunsaker testified that on May 21, 1951, the 
Salt Lake City Police Department received a telegram 
from the Chief Probation Officer of the State of Cali-
fornia requesting that the defendant be picked up and 
described the automobile he was driving (R. 46). Offi-
cers Longson and Olson testified that the car described 
in the telegram was located early on the morning of 
1Iay 23, 1951 on the west side of State Street just south 
of the intersection of Third South; that the automobile 
was watched until approximately 2 P.M. on May 23, 
1951, at which time the officers were relieved by Officer 
Farley after having had a conversation with him near 
the Center Theater on Third South and State Street, at 
which time the car was pointed out to him. Officer Far-
ley proceeded in the direction of the automobile shortly 
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thereafter and Officer Olson observed that the car had 
been moved. He got into his automobile and proceeded 
south on State Street where the automobile had been 
parked and observed that it had been moved. He then 
made a turn on State Street and started north immedi-
ately behind the DeSoto automobile driven by Officer 
Farley. Shortly after the car crossed the intersection of 
Third South and State Street it struck the parked car 
and immediately stopped. Officer Olson got out of his 
car. He heard no shots or observed any disturbance in 
the automobile driven by Officer Farley. He next saw 
Officer Farley lying on the street between two cars and 
heard him say, "Call the police," which were the only 
words uttered by Officer Farley who immediately be-
came unconscious. (R. 63). He remained with him until 
the ambulance arrived. 
Three witnesses produced by the State (R. 67-87) 
all testified in substance that they were in the close 
proximity of the DeSoto automobile parked on the west 
side of State Street at or near the entrance to Auerbach's 
Department Store. All observed a man and woman ap-
proach the automobile from the south and Officer Farley 
approach from the north; that the woman entered the 
car and sat down, and Officer Farley with his gun drawn 
approached the man and after a conversation proceeded 
to search his person. The search occupied from ten to 
fifteen minutes and they observed Officer Farley com-
pletely search the defendant from his shoes to his head, 
inside and outside, removing from the inside of his coat 
pocket certain papers. At the completion of the search 
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Officer Farley placed the man's hands behind him and 
put his handcuffs on him with his hands to his back and 
then assisted him into the automobile. Th~e woman re-
mained in the automobile throughout the entire search 
and had in her hands magazines, a package and a hand-
bag and at no time did Officer Farley search the woman 
or engage in conversation with her. Officer Farley 
placed the defendant in the front seat between himself 
and the woman, started the automobile, made a "U" 
turn after backing out and proceeded north on State 
Street in the direction of the Police Station (R. 67-87). 
Glen A. Pratt testified that shortly after 2 P.M. on 
~lay 23, 1951, he ·was crossing the intersection of Third 
South and State Street in the direction of the Center 
Theater and observed a DeSoto automobile proceeding 
north through the intersection, saw the automobile crash 
into a parked car after it had passed him and observed 
that the occupants in the automobile were struggling. 
He observed a woman leave the car, step over the curb 
and disappear into the crowd. He saw Officer Farley 
lying on the street with his head in the lap of a person 
wearing a Postman's uniform. He observed Officer Far-
ley and did not hear him talk or speak to anyone. (R. 91) 
He saw a man running across the street to the west with 
his hands behind him and his coat over them. 
Witness Joseph M. Anderson stated that he was a 
mail carrier; that he was in front of 261 South State 
Street and had just come out of the Rogerson's Music 
Company as the DeSoto automobile struck a parked car. 
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He observed that there were three occupants in the front 
seat of the car. The woman left the car first by the right 
hand door, then one of the occupants fell from the car 
to the street and just before the fall he heard words to 
the effect, ''Do you want another one~'' or to the effect, 
"If you want another one I'll give you one more." (R. 
98-99). The witness lifted the head of Officer Farley 
into his arms and while holding him Officer Farley 
stated, "I am a police officer." "He shot me." "Call 
the Department.'' No one else was assisting Officer 
Farley and the witness did not see Officer Olson. He 
was standing on' the sidewalk and did not get out .into 
the street until the woman had left and Officer Farley 
was out of the car (R. 108). He heard the statements 
made while standing- on the sidewalk 18 or 20 feet away 
and 3 feet from the door of Rogerson's Music Company. 
There was a string of automobiles parked along the 
street between the witness and the DeSoto car and at 
the preliminary hearing he testified that he was 24 feet 
away from the car when he heard the utterances testified 
to (R. 110). Robert H. Jensen, Sr., Postman, testified 
that he was in Rogerson's Music Store and heard two 
cars hit together, and immediately stepped outside and 
observed a scuffle in the automobile. He saw the right 
door of the car open and a man come out head first rolling 
partly under a parked car. There were three occupants 
in the car. The woman left the car first and proceeded 
north on State Street. He was about 10 feet from the 
car and heard the man in the car say, "Do you want an-
other~'' The man in the car got out on the west side and 
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ran west across State Street with his arms behind him. 
This he observed as he was standing near the curb and 
on the sidewalk and was never in the street. 
Wilma Lenoma Tully, a witness called by the State 
testified that she met the defendant in Reno, Nevada on 
Sunday, the 20th of ~lay about 7 o'clock A.M. She had 
not known him before and they decided to come to Salt 
Lake City where they arrived on Monday the 21st day 
of ~lay, and registered at a motel and on Tuesday, May 
22, they both went to Ogden where she purchased some 
shells for a gun at the request of the defendant. They 
spent most of the day in and around Ogden and decided 
to remain there for the night, but later changed their 
plans and proceeded to Salt Lake City, arriving about 
11 P.l\I. and registering at the St. George Hotel. After 
removing all of their belongings from the automobile 
which had been parked on the street, the defendant 
having informed the witness that they would not return 
to Reno in the automobile but would attempt to obtain 
passage on the air lines. On May 23, both spent the 
morning shopping and visiting various taverns in Salt 
Lake City. After eating lunch about 1 P.M. it was de-
cided that they would return to Reno in the automobile 
and obtained a cab for the purpose of locating the same 
which was parked the previous night. The automobile 
was located on State Street south of Third South and 
both alighted from the cab and proceeded in the direc-
tion of the automobile. The ·witness got into the rar on 
the right hand side and defendant proceeded around the 
front of the automobile to get in on the left hand or 
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driver's side. He was immediately accosted by Officer 
Farley who was standing near the car and questioned as 
to his identity. He was then searched by Officer Farley 
which was observed by the witness. She stated that the 
search was from the defendants armpitts to his kneea 
(R. 138). The defendant was then handcuffed with his 
hands behind him and assisted into the car sitting next 
to the witness. Officer Farley sat next to the defendant 
in the driver's seat, started the automobile and made a 
"U" turn and headed toward the Police Station. Some 
conversation took place between Officer Farley and the 
defendant, immediately after crossing the intersection 
at Third South Street it appeared to the witness that the 
defendant was moving closer to the officer and was 
locking shoulders with him (R. 139). She then heard a 
shot and the officer lost control of the automobile which 
crashed into a parked car. As soon as he lost control of 
the automobile and while slumped the officer called to 
a postman on the street requesting him to call an ambu-
lance (R. 140). She then left the car by the right hand 
door and ran to the sidewalk, entered the Regis Hotel 
where she registered and remained there until 10 P.M. 
and was then driven to Wendover where she was arrested 
the following day. 
K. Robert Tschaggeny testified that he was driving 
his automobile south on State Street the afternoon of 
May 23, 1951. He saw the automobile in which the de-
fendant was riding and saw the defendant leave the 
automobile and as he passed his car he observed that 
the defendant was handcuffed and had a revolver in his 
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hands. The defendant boarded a Salt Lake City Lines 
bus at Third South and State Street. The witness fol-
lowed the bus and at Fourth South he picked up Officer 
Simonson and they followed the bus to Fifth South where 
the defendant left the bus and disappeared. (R. 195). 
Officer Simonson testified that he accompanied Mr. 
Tschaggeny in his automobile and attempted to appre-
hend the defendant (R. 209). Mrs. Ronnie Charlot testi-
fied that she was sitting in her automobile at the A & W 
Root Beer Stand at Fifth South and State Street and 
the defendant approached her automobile stating, "I 
have a gun here lady and I '11 shoot you if you don't do 
what I say." (R. 214). That the defendant left immedi-
atelyand the witness observed that he had a gun and his 
hands were handcuffed behind his back. R. W. Fish 
testified that he was an employee of the Streator Chev-
rolet Company and on :May 23, 1951, shortly after 2 :30 
P .. M. he saw the defendant in the shop where he was 
working. His hands were handcuffed in front of him 
and he observed a gun in his hand and defendant threat-
ened him (R. 220). Harry Jones testified that he found 
a gun in the paint shop in a sink, which gun was offered 
and received in evidence. (R. 224). 
Officer Hunsaker identified the clothing worn by 
Officer Farley and the same was received in evidence 
(R. 233), together with the handcuffs. Officer Clark 
was called as a witness and demonstrated to the jury 
the movability of his hands after being handcuffed with 
his hands behind him and while sitting on a chair in 
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front of the jury box and in the presence of the jury 
(R. 237-242). 
The defendant, called as a witness on his own be-
half, testified that he obtained the DeSoto automobile 
in San Francisco, California and left San Francisco for 
Reno, Nevada on May 18. While in Reno he met Wilma 
Lenoma Tully who accompanied him to Salt Lake City 
where they arrived on Monday, the 21st day of May, and 
went to Ogden arriving there about noon. While in 
Ogden Mrs. Tully purchased a box of shells which were 
the type and caliber which fit the gun owned by defend-
ant, which gun was carried by Mrs. Tully in her handbag 
from the time both left Reno for Salt Lake City. Both 
defendant and Mrs. Tully participated in a robbery of 
a motel in Ogden after which they returned to Salt Lake 
City and registered at the St. George Hotel, leaving 
their automobile on State Street below Third South after 
removing all their clothing and belongings from such 
automobile. At about 2 P.M. they attempted to locate 
the automobile and were approaching it when the de-
fendant was accosted by Officer Farley who placed him 
under arrest after searching his person and proceeded 
to the Police Station. The car stopped at the intersection 
of Third South and State and after crossing the inter-
section Officer Farley pushed the defendant back in the 
seat and reached across the defendant's lap. There was 
a crash and a shot and Officer Farley went out the right 
side of the car immediately after Mrs. Tully and the 
defendant went out the left side and across State Street. 
10 
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He stated that at no time did he have the gun in his hands 
and did not shoot Officer Farley. 
On cross examination over defendant's objections 
he testified that he had been convicted of three or four 
felonies, the first in 1945. He was a parole violator from 
the State of California, was wanted for stealing payroll 
checks in California (R. 290) and if he was returned to 
California he was going to have to serve from 5 years to 
life (R. 290). He had cashed and forged 47 checks stolen 
by him (R. 294). The defendant denied that before 
leaving California he had robbed Fulton's Food Shop 
and denied that he had committed a robbery of the Boule-
vard Pharmacy in California (R. 295) or robbed a gro-
cery store in San Francisco. (R. 295) 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
I. 
The court erred in refusing to recognize that the 
State failed to prove the commission of the crime of first 
degree murder, the evidence disclosing that: 
(a) The verdict and judgment were contrary to law. 
(b) The verdict and judgment were contrary to the 
evidence. 
(c) The evidence was insufficient to support the 
verdict of the jury. 
11 
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II. 
The court erred in allowing the witnesses, Norman 
R. Cortsen and Mrs. Ronnie Charlot to testify over de-
fendant's objections relative to statements made by the 
defendant after the homicide. 
III. 
The court erred in allowing the witness Harold W. 
Clark over defendant's objections, to demonstrate to the 
jury the movability of his hands and body with a gun in 
his hands handcuffed behind him. 
IV. 
The court erred in allowing the District Attorney, 
over the objection of the defendant, to interrogate the 
defendant relative to the commission of crimes by him 
which in no way were connected with the crime for which 
he was being tried. 
v. 
The court erred in allowing the District Attorney, 
over the objections of the defendant, to interrogate the 
defendant respecting the commission of crimes which the 
defendant had not been charged with or convicted. 
VI. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
a new trial. 
12 
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VII. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
a new trial in the absence of defendant's counsel. 
VIII. 
The court erred in imposing sentence on the de-
fendant in the absence of defendant's counsel. 
IX. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
a rehearing of defendant's motion for a new trial. 
X. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
an order of examination of designated physical evidence 
received at the trial. 
XI. 




THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REC-
OGNIZE THAT THE STATE FAILED TO 
PROVE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF 
FIRST DEGREE MURDER, THERE BEING A 
LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE IN-
STRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT. (Specifi-
cation of Error No. I, (a) (b) (c). 
13 
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At the close of the State's evidence, the defendant 
filed his motion to dismiss the information as to the 
offense of first degree murder as set out in such infor-
mation, said motion being based on the grounds that the 
State had failed to prove that the crime charged in such 
information was the wilful, deliberate, malicious and 
premeditated act of the defendant. (R. 17) Such motion 
was by the court denied. (R. 18) 
It is a well recognized and undisputed principle of 
law in this state that in order for a person to be con-
victed of murder in the first degree and in order to 
warrant an instruction defining this degree of murder, 
there must be some evidence which would indicate that 
the crime was premeditated and that at the exact time 
of the commission of the crime there was in the mind of 
the accused a specific intent to take the life of the victim. 
This court has consistently, in a long line of decisions, 
adhered to such rule and to cite the numerous decisions 
of this court would be of no benefit or advantage to the 
court. The evidence offered on behalf of the state was 
that the shooting occurred during a scuffle between the 
defendant and the deceased and there is wholly a lack 
of evidence that the defendant, if the shooting was done 
by the defendant, had any preconceived design to shoot 
the deceased or that there was any deliberate or pre-
meditated design to kill. 
The evidence produced on behalf of the State is 
wholly insufficient to support the verdict of the jury 
and counsel for the defendant, under their statement of 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fads, have considered it necessary and essential to nar-
rate the evidence and further to solicit the court's atten-
tion to their contention that under the evidence produced 
it would have been impossible for the defendant to have 
fired the shot that killed the deceased. 
The undisputed evidence testified to by three wit-
nesses for the state was that the defendant was thor-
oughly searched by the deceased before being placed in 
the automobile a few moments before the shot was fired, 
the other occupant of the car was not searched, in her 
hands were her purse and a package, the defendant's 
hands were handcuffed behind him, all three persons 
occupied the front seat of the automobile, one shot was 
fired immediately after the car crossed the intersection 
at 3rd South and State Streets, and the assistant city 
physician testified that the bullet that killed the deceased 
entered the body at a point two inches above the naval 
and one inch to the right of the middle line, the point 
of exit being two inches to the left of the middle line of 
the second lumbar vertebra. 
From such evidence it cannot be disputed that the 
deceased was shot from the front, which act, under the 
circumstances, could not be done by a person with his 
hands handcuffed behind his back. Witnesses produced 
by the State testified to statements alleged to have been 
made by the defendant at the time of the shooting. (R. 
98-99, 110.) Such statements, according to the witnesses, 
were heard by them while standing on the sidewalk from 
10 to 20 feet away from the automobile in which the 
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defendant and the deceased were sitting. Such evidence 
should be entitled to little or no weight considering the 
circumstances under which such statements were alleged 
to have been made. 
Counsel for defendant is well aware that the answer 
to the foregoing is that the jury believed otherwise and 
there is not a lack of evidence upon which their verdict 
could be sustained. However, we deem it worthy of 
attention by the court and meriting consideration in con-
nection with error hereinafter to be called to the atten-
tion of the court. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE WIT-
NESS NORMAN R. CORTSEN, AND THE WIT-
NESS MRS. RONNIE CHARLOT TO TESTIFY 
OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS RELA-
TIVE TO STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DE-
FENDANT AFTER THE HOMICIDE. (Specifi-
cation of Error No. II.) 
The trial Court permitted witness Norman R. Cort-
sen to testify concerning a statement he claimed the 
defendant made to him on a Salt Lake City Lines Bus 
after the shooting of Officer Farley. This testimony 
was admitted over the objection of defendant's counsel 
(R. 203) and after an examination into the question of 
its admissibility in chambers out of the presence of the 
jury (R. 202). 
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The testimony to which objection was made is as 
follows: "Keep moving, I just shot a man". (R. 204) 
This statement was alleged to have been made by the 
defendant as the bus approached the intersection of 4th 
South and State Streets, the defendant having boarded 
the bus at 3rd South and State Streets. 
Counsel for the defendant moved to strike the state-
ment of Cortsen about what the defendant had said to 
him on the grounds that it was hearsay and incompetent. 
The motion was denied (R. 205). 
It is significant that the statement "Keep moving, 
I just shot a man", was, according to the witness Cort-
sen, not made until the bus reached the intersection of 
4th South and State Streets. Although Cortsen claimed 
certain other statements were made by the defendant, 
he could not remember what they were (R. 208). 
Counsel for the defendant contend that the state-
ments of the defendant testified to by Cortsen were made 
at a time and place sufficiently remote from the shooting 
as not to be part of the res gestae, nor admissible under 
any other recognized exception to the hearsay rule. 
It should be borne in mind that after the shooting 
the defendant left the car in which he and officer Farley 
had been riding, ran west across State Street, then South 
to 3rd South and State Streets, boarded a crowded bus 
and rode a block through normal midday traffic before 
the statement attributed to him was made. (R. 282-283.) 
The same considerations are applicable to the state-
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ment the witness Mrs. Ronnie Charlot testified the de-
fendant made to her. They were, however, more remote 
in point of time and distance than those made to Norman 
Cortsen. 
After riding the bus from Third to Fifth South 
Street on State Street the defendant entered a parked 
car at the A. & W. Drive In which was occupied by Mrs. 
Ronnie Charlot. (R. 214, R. 253) Mrs. Charlot stated 
the defendant said to her, "I have a gun here lady, and 
I'll shoot you if you don't do what I say". (R. 214) 
It is the position of counsel that the statement IS 
unrelated to the crime which was committed by reason 
of the lapse of time between the commission of the crime 
and the alleged statement, and further, and more import-
ant, it makes no reference to the shooting, nor to any of 
the circumstances connected with it, or even that it 
occurred. Counsel therefore urge that the statement, 
obviously damaging to the defendant was not part of the 
res gestae and was wholly inadmissible. 
The theory upon which counsel for the State offered 
the testimony of witness Cortsen was that the statement 
alleged to have been made by the defendant to Cortsen 
constituted an admission against interest, and admissible 
as part of the res gestae, although hearsay. (R. 202) 
This Court has frequently discussed the considera-
tions governing what may or may not be received as 
part of the res gestae. The general rule has been applied 
by this Court in both criminal and civil cases. A state-
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ment of these general considerations is found in Jackson 
Y. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 U. 21, 290 P. 970. 
The ease inYolved a collision between an auto and a 
street ear. A question arose as to the admissibility of 
statements made by the motorman after the accident. 
:Mr. Justice Staup says at page 976 as follows: 
" ... the general limitations of the res gestae rule 
so far as are here necessary, are stated to be that 
the declaration or utterance must be spontaneous 
or instinctiYe; that it must relate to or be con-
nected with the main or principal event or trans-
action itself material and admissible in evidence; 
and that it must have been the result or product, 
the outgrowth, of the immediate and present in-
fluences of the main event, or preceding circum-
stances to which it relates, and must be contem-
poraneous with it and tend to explain or elucidate 
it. It is further stated that the word 'contempor-
aneous' is not taken literally, and that time is not 
the real governing factor in the determination, 
but is an important element in determining 
whether the statement was spontaneous and imme-
diately connected with the main transaction and 
prompted or produced by its immediate and 
present influences.'' 
We believe this fairly states the general rule laid down 
in numerous Utah cases and in well reasoned decisions 
from other jurisdictions, and it remains only to apply 
the rule, or rules to the testimony in question here. The 
position of counsel for the defendant is that all the testi-
mony received which is covered by this specification of 
error was too remote in time and distance, and did not 
amount to spontaneous or instinctive utterances. 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The case of People v. Wong Loung, 114 P. 829, de-
cided by the Supreme Court of California was a prosecu-
tion for murder. The state introduced evidence of certain 
statements made by the defendant to apprehending offi-
cers shortly after the shooting, during which time the 
defendant had run one block. The court held that these 
statements were improperly admitted in evidence. At 
page 833 the court says : 
''Error is assigned relative to the conversation 
between the arresting officers when they took 
Wong Loung into custody. One of them said, 'This 
is the man', or 'This is the Chinaman', and the 
defendant exclaimed, 'I haven't anything', or 'I 
haven't done anything. I haven't got any gun'. 
The Attorney General insists that this conversa-
tion was part of the res gestae and properly ad-
mitted as such. We cannot agree with that con-
tention. The officers had run some distance from 
the scene of the crime, turning a corner and pro-
ceeding along another street from that upon 
which the wounded Chinaman fell, and had finally 
apprehended Wong Loung near the end of an 
alley. What there occurred was no more a part 
of the res gestae than it would have been if their 
pursuit had covered a mile rather than a distance 
of about a block." 
We submit that this is a proper application of the 
considerations which determine what is part of the res 
gestae, and the application which should be made to the 
evidence under discussion in this specification of error. 
The question of admissibility of what was claimed 
to be part of the res gestae was discussed by this Court 
in the recent case of State v. Peterson, 240 P. (2d) 504. 
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A purported confession to the commission of a burglary 
was made an hour after the crime was involved. The trial 
court excluded the purported confession, and was af-
firmed by this Court. Mr. Justice Wolfe in the opinion 
refers to a concurring opinion in State v. Rasmussen, 
92 Utah 357, 68 P. (2d) 176, 183 and quotes from it as 
follows: 
'' ... the so-called res gestae is in fact simply an-
other exception to the hearsay rule, based on the 
fact that there are assurances sufficient to make 
it reliable even though there is no opportunity to 
cross examine. But that assurance based on the 
spontaneity necessary to make it the automatic 
result of the excitation engendered by the occasion 
and to eliminate any probability that it was the 
product of reflection or rationalization must be 
present. It should be noted that since the sole 
basis for admitting statements of this kind de-
pends on ·what we have chosen to call their 'auto-
matic' nature, the court should be fairly well 
convinced that such basis exists; otherwise, state-
ments of witnesses in regard to which there may 
be no opportunity to cross-examine will be ad-
mitted to the great prejudice of the opposite 
party''. 
The opinion in the main case states : 
"It is readily apparent that the extra-judicial 
purported confession of Olmsted cannot meet this 
prescribed test. Because of the time and the cir-
cumstances surrounding its making, it lacks the 
characteristics which allow the relaxation of the 
hearsay rule. The trial court properly excluded 
from evidence the 'confession' of Olmstead''. 
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We submit that the testimony offered by these two 
witnesses was damaging to the defendant, and that upon 
proper application of the rules prescribed by this court 
for the determination of what may be admitted as part 
of the res gestae, the testimony objected to should have 
been excluded by the trial court. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE WIT-
NESS HAROLD W. CLARK, OVER DEFEND-
ANT'S OBJECTIONS, TO DEMONSTRATE TO 
THE JURY THE MOVABILITY OF HIS HANDS 
AND BODY WITH A GUN IN HIS HANDS 
HANDCUFFED BEHIND HIM. (Specification 
of Error No. III.) 
During the trial Police officer Harold W. Clark was 
permitted to make a demonstration for the jury con-
cerning his ability to point a gun at an imaginary person 
at his left while his hands were cuffed behind him. This 
purported demonstration was objected to by counsel for 
the defendant (R. 238-239). 
The witness Wilma Lenoma Tully testified that as 
officer Farley, the defendant and she drove from ihe 
scene of the arrest toward the police station they were 
all seated in the front seat of the defendant's rented car. 
Officer Farley was in the driver's seat, the defendant 
in the middle, and Wilma Tully on the right hand side 
opposite the driver. (R. 180, 181) This seating arrange-
ment is corroborated by the testimony of Mrs. Jasmine 
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G. Lym. (R. 75, 77) Other witnesses to the arrest also 
testified that Officer Farley, the defendant, and Wilma 
Tully were all seated in the front seat as the officer 
drove away. 
In his demonstration Officer Clark was permitted 
to use a folding chair with no arms. There were no per-
sons seated on either side of him. He was permitted to 
swing his legs to the right of the chair so that he was 
facing sideways on it. (R. 239) No one was seated to 
the left of Officer Clark to demonstrate what part of the 
body of a person there seated (the position Officer Far-
ley occupied in the car) would have been in the line of 
fire of the gun, or at what angle the gun would have 
been pointed at the body of a person so seated. (R. 239} 
There was a complete and absolute lack of similarity 
between the conditions existing at the time when Officer 
Farley was shot, and those which were present during 
the demonstration offered by the State to show how the 
defendant might have shot officer Farley from the posi-
tion he occupied in the car. The failure of the State to 
have someone seated in the position to the left of the 
witness Clark during the demonstration is important 
when it is considered that the bullet which killed officer 
Farley entered his body at a point one inch above and 
one and one half inches to the right of the umbilicus, 
and emerged two inches to the left of the midline of the 
back at the level of the second lumbar vertebra. This is 
found in the testimony of Dr. John Marshall who per-
formed an autopsy (R. 40). It is apparent from this 
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testimony that the bullet passed almost directly through 
officer Farley's body from front to back, and it makes 
the angle at which the gun was pointed at him of extreme 
importance. No effort was made whatever by the State 
to simulate the conditions which existed at the time of 
the shooting so that the jury could see during the dem-
onstration whether it would have been possible for the 
defendant from the position in which he was sitting to 
have shot officer Farley at the angle from which he was 
shot, or in fact to have shot him at all. 
The general rule announced by numerous decisions 
with respect to the admissibility of demonstrative evi-
dence, or experiments is that to render experiments per-
missible the conditions need not be identical with those 
existing at the time of the occurrence, but that it is suf-
ficient if there is a substantial similarity. The rule ap-
pears to obtain in civil as well as in criminal cases. State 
v. Copenbarge, Idaho, 16 P. (2d) 383, State v. McKenna, 
California, 79 P. (2d) 1065; Cooper v. State, Okla., 67 P. 
(2d) 981; People v. Crawford, California, 106 P. (2d) 
219; Hamby v. People, Colo., 129 P. (2d) 993. 
The case of Hall v. Brown, Oregon, 202 P. 719, states 
the general rule above contended for. The case involved 
an action by a lessee of farming land for recovery for 
loss of the property at the hands of the lessor, damage 
to crops, and for money spent in sowing and cultivating. 
A witness for plaintiff was permitted to testify he had 
seen the land in question and that he assumed the method 
of cultivation by the plaintiff was like his own. 
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At page 721 the court makes the following state-
ments: 
''Such testimony is very closely analogous to evi-
dence of experiments and is governed by similar 
rules. Similar occurrences, like experiments are 
admissible under certain circumstances for the 
purpose of showing the probable result of the 
transaction in question, but to be admissible it 
must be shown that the conditions are substan-
tially like those in the matter in dispute." 
The court at page 721 quotes from an earlier Oregon 
case, Leonard v. Southern, 21 Ore. 555, 28 P. 887, as 
follows: 
''Experiments and demonstrations used in evi-
dence should be made under conditions similar to 
those attending the fact to be illustrated; and 
when this rule is observed, the discretion of the 
trial court in allowing the result of such experi-
ments to go to the jury will not be reviewed, in 
the absence of abuse thereof. ' ' 
The Court then comments upon when the trial court 
has discretion and uses the following language: 
'' The principle is that at best it is within the dis-
cretion of the court to admit any testimony what-
ever about experiments or similar occurrences. 
But in any event the conditions must appear to be 
substantially the same. It is not within the dis-
cretion of the court to admit evidence about ex-
periments, unless the conditions are substantially 
alike.'' 
It is the position of counsel for the defendant that 
the conditions present at the demonstration in court by 
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officer Clark were so completely dissimilar to those 
which existed at the time of the shooting that the trial 
court was without discretion to admit the demonstration, 
and further that if it could be presumed that the nature 
of the demonstration lay within the area of discretion 
of the trial court that the permission to make the demon-
stration by Clark was clearly an abuse of such discre-
tion. It seems manifest, that the demonstration was 
highly damaging and prejudicial to the defendant 1n 
view of the way in which it was conducted. 
In People v. Halbert, Cal., 248 P. 969, the following 
comment appears at page 972 bearing upon the degree 
of similarity of conditions necessary to permit the intro-
duction of experimental evidence: 
''In order that experimental evidence in corro-
boration or disproof shall be of any value, it must 
be shown that the conditions affecting the result 
are, as near as may be identical with those existing 
at the time of and operating to produce the par-
ticular effect. An absolute identity is, of course, 
impossible, but a substantial identity must exist 
to give the evidence value.'' 
We submit that in the trial of this case the substan-
tial identity is wholly lacking and the evidence should 
not have been received under any theory of similar 
occurrences or experiments. 
In Harper v. Blasi, Colo., 151 P. (2d) 760, an action 
for assault and battery, the trial court permitted a wit-
ness to testify as to an experiment conducted by him 
with a mask, an artificial eye and rimless glasses to 
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determine whether a blow struck as plaintiff testified 
could have produced the injury complained of. The 
Supreme Court of Colorado in the opinion held that the 
admission of such evidence was error, and at page 761 
of 151 P. (2d) uses the following language: 
"We think the experiment and its description 
improper. There was no similarity of conditions, 
no way of establishing equality of strength or 
skill, and no indication that, accepting the conclu-
sions of the witness, this evidence was even help-
ful. There was no compliance with the rules 
under which similar experiments are held admis-
sible ... " 
The case of Martin v. Anges City Baseball Ass'n., 
California, 40 P. (2d) 287 has some important comment 
upon the care which must be exercised by the trial court 
in determining the admissibility of demonstrative evi-
dence where bodily movements are sought to be simu-
lated. The case was a damage suit for injury arising 
when the plaintiff fell while going down a stairway 
owned by the defendant ball club. The defendant offered 
evidence of experiment by a witness in approaching and 
descending the stairway in the manner the plaintiff had 
testified she had done it. At page 288 of 40 P. (2d) the 
court had the following to say : 
"While it is the general rule that experimental 
evidence is admissible if it substantially tends to 
establish the fact it is offered to prove, it is 
nevertheless discretionary with the trial court to 
limit the extent to which such evidence may be 
received; and it is the duty of the court to refuse 
its admission when it is doubtful whether it is 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
likely to tend more to confusion than to justify or 
certainty. (citing cases) The results of experi-
ments made by an individual chosen for the pur-
pose to demonstrate bodily movements in walking 
or in approaching and descending a stairway are 
so likely in the nature of things to be what the 
mind of the individual suggests that it is extreme-
ly doubtful whether such personal experiments 
are safe as proof. Clearly there was no abuse of 
discretion in denying admission of such proof 
under the circumstances of this case.'' 
It is strenuously urged that the demonstration of 
officer Clark was of that kind and depended largely if 
not entirely for its execution on ''what the mind of the 
individual suggests''. Such evidence should be received 
with caution even where some similarity of conditions 
is shown, and certainly should not be received in a case 
of this kind where no similarity exists at all. 
This Court's attention is invited to a recent Cali-
fornia case, People v. Sherman, 217 P. (2d) 715. This 
was an arson prosecution wherein there was attempted 
to be demonstrated the relative inflammability of certain 
materials which were claimed to have been burned in 
the building damaged. The trial court was affirmed for 
denying admission of such evidence even though the 
materials were the same, the same conditions did not 
exist in the court room as in the upholstery shop which 
was burned. 
The case of R. D. Clancy v. State of Texas, 247 S.W. 
865, was a prosecution for aggravated assault. The de-
fendant allegedly while sitting in a motion picture theater 
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unauthorizedly placed his hand on the leg of a young 
woman sitting near him. At the trial evidence was of-
fered by the sheriff as to certain experiments he had 
conducted with the theater seats to determine if the 
touching could have been done by the defendant in the 
manner claimed. The evidence was received and the 
Court of Criminal appeals held that it was error for 
want of a showing of similarity of conditions between 
the actual occurrence and the experiment. A report of 
this case appears in 27 A.L.R. 857, a~d at page 859 the 
opinion states as follows: 
''Complaint is made of the admission of the testi-
mony of the sheriff as to experiments made by 
him with certain chairs in the theater building in 
question. It is made to appear as a result of such 
experiment the sheriff found that the hand of a 
person sitting in a seat could be thrust under the 
seat beside him, under certain conditions, in such 
manner as to be able to reach and touch the leg 
of a person sitting to the rear. The general rule 
in regard to testimony of experiments is that 
same must be made under conditions similar, or 
approximately similar, to those which surrounded 
the original transaction, and when there is ob-
jection made, proof must appear of substantial 
similarity. We find nothing in the record which 
shows that all the seats in the theater in question 
were similarly constructed, and the proof as to 
the fact that the chairs examined by the sheriff 
were similar to those occupied by appellant and 
the young woman in question seems to fail. It was 
a material question as to whether a hand could be 
reached under the seat and placed upon the leg of 
the prosecuting witness, between her ankle and 
her knee. The testimony as to the experiment, if 
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of a similar situation, was material. In the ab-
sence of a showing of substantial similarity the 
evidence of the experiment should not have been 
received.'' 
IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DIS-
TRICT ATTORNEY, OVER THE OBJECTIONS 
OF THE DEFENDANT TO INTERROGATE THE 
DEFENDANT RESPECTING THE COMMIS-
SION OF CRIMES WITH WHICH THE DE-
FENDANT HAD NEITHER BEEN CHARGED 
NOR CONVICTED. (Specification of Error IV.-
V.) 
The defendant testified in his own behalf at the trial 
(R. 245-288) and was subjected to extensive cross ex-
amination by counsel for the state. It is the belief of 
counsel for the defendant that in the commission of the 
errors referred to in these specifications the greatest 
injustice was done to this defendant at the trial. Nothing 
could be less fair or more completely prejudicial to thiA 
defendant than the questions the District Attorney was 
permitted to ask the defendant under the guise of testing 
his credibility. The questions asked the defendant and 
called to this court's attention in these two specifications 
of error clearly show that an unqualified effort was made 
to try this defendant upon the basis of his past record, 
and not upon the facts which might be adduced by the 
prosecution tending to show that the defendant com-
mitted the crime with which he was here charged. 
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The line of questions put to the defendant on cross 
examination respecting his previous criminal record 
began with the District Attorney asking whether the 
defendant had been convicted of a felony, to which he 
answered that he had. (R. 288) The District Attorney 
then asked how many, to which an objection was made, 
and overruled. (R. 289) The defendant was then asked 
to state the kind and number of felonies. (R. 289) The 
defendant was asked if he didn't know at the time of 
the arrest that he was wanted by the state parole officer 
of California. This was objected to and the objection 
overruled. (R. 289) 
The defendant was then asked if he didn't know he 
was wanted in California for four robberies. (R. 290} 
This was objected to and again the objection was over-
ruled. It is significant to note that nowhere in the record 
is there any offer to show that the defendant was wanted 
for any robberies anywhere. 
Upon further cross examination the defendant was 
extensively questioned about his violation of parole, and 
the possibility that he would be returned to California 
to serve additional time. All this was objected to and 
the objections were overruled. (R. 289-290) Still later 
the defendant was questioned, over the objection of his 
counsel which was overruled, about the perpetration of 
certain forgeries. (R. 294) 
Still later in cross examination the District Attorney 
was permitted over the objection of counsel for the 
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defendant (R. 294) to ask the following specific ques-
tions: 
"Q. Now, and before you left California you 
robbed the Fulton Food Shop at 1801 Fulton 
Street in San Francisco, didn't you~ (R. 
295) 
A. No sir. (R. 295) 
Q. And before you left California and on May 
17, you committed a robbery at the Boule-
vard Pharmacy at eight twenty-three P.M. 
on May 17, didn't you~ (R. 295) 
A. No sir. (R. 295) 
Q. And before you left California you commit-
ted a robbery at a grocery store on May 17 
at eight forty-five P.M., the grocery store 
being at 37 40 Irving Street in San Francisco, 
California~ You pulled that robbery, didn't 
you~ (R. 296) 
A. No sir. (R. 296) 
The damaging and meretricious aspect of these ques-
tions which the prosecution was permitted to ask is that 
there is not a shred of evidence in the record, and none 
was ever offered that this defendant was ever charged 
with such robberies, or in fact that such crimes had- ever 
been committed. 
It is the position of counsel that if the prosecution 
is permitted to ask questions of that sort without ever 
laying any kind of foundation, or introducing any evi-
dence whatever that the defendant has been charged, 
or that the crimes have been committed, that a DiRtrict 
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Attorney can accuse a defendant of the commission of 
any crime, or any number of crimes whether they are 
connected in any way with the defendant. This puts the 
defendant in the position of having to deny something 
with which, as in this case, he has never been charged. 
It gives, and is designed to give, the jury the impression 
that the defendant is an habitual criminal, and that none 
of his testimony is to be believed. It is difficult to ima-
gine any type or line of questions which could be more 
completely prejudicial to this or any defendant, and we 
submit that such questions were put to the defendant 
with no other purpose that to prejudice him with the 
jury. 
The general rule is that the commission of the of-
fense for which a person is on trial cannot be proved by 
evidence that such person committed another but inde-
pendent offense. 
"* * * evidence which shows or tends to show that 
accused has committed another crime wholly inde-
pendent of, and unconnected with, that for which 
he is on trial, even though it is a crime of the same 
sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible, and such evi-
dence of an independent crime is inadmissible for 
the reason, among others, that it ordinarily does 
not tend to establish the commission by accused 
of the offense charged, that accused must be tried 
for one offense at a time, and that, in accordance 
with the more extensive general rule, which ap-
plies to all cases, civil or criminal, the evidence 
must be confined to the point in issue. Questions 
regarding the admissibility of such evidence have 
been said to be within the wise discretion of the 
trial court, whose rulings thereon should not be 
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interfered with on review except where such dis-
cretion is abused, or unless it is clear that the 
questioned evidence has no bearing on any of the 
issues involved in the charge.'' 
22 C.J.S., Criminal law, Sec. 682. 
The case of State v. Owen, Kansas, 176 P. (2d) 564, 
in discussing the general rule as to the admissibility of 
such evidence, notes as follows : 
''Evidence of a similar offense is competent only, 
under the exceptions to the general rule, as tend-
ing to show the elements of the offense for which 
a person is on trial. A majority of this court be-
lieves that the conviction of the former offense 
had no probative value with reference to any ele-
ment of crime for which appellant was on trial. 
The evidence was prejudicial and its admission 
over appellant's objection constituted an abuse of 
sound judicial discretion. Counsel for the state 
also placed too much emphasis on the former 
offense in his cross-examination of appellant. In 
view of this conclusion we need not determine 
whether the former offense was a similar offense 
or whether the instruction requires a reversal. 
It is sufficient to say the instruction did not cure 
the erroneous admission of the testimony.'' 
This court has held in numerous cases that if facts 
constituting collateral offenses are relevant and tend to 
establish any of the necessary elements of the crime 
charged, other than by merely showing defendant's bad 
character and propensity to commit similar crimes, proof 
of such facts are admissible even though showing that 
defendant has committed other offenses. State v. N emier, 
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et al., 106 Utah 307, 148 P. (2d) 327, and cases therein 
cited. At page 329 it is stated: 
"Very frequently there is found in the cases some 
form of rule like the following: 'Evidence of 
similar offenses are never admissible except to 
prove some fact in issue.' Now obviously this 
form of statement is substantially the original 
rule, putting the substance of the old into the 
form of the new. * * * See e. g., 8 R.C.L. (1914) 
199: 'The rule against admitting proof of ex-
traneous crimes is subject, however, to certain 
exceptions. In making proof it is competent for 
the prosecution to put in evidence all relevant 
facts and circumstances which tend to establish 
any of the constitutive elements of the crime of 
which the defendant is accused.' This was adopt-
ed by the court in State v. Anderton, supra, and 
other cases. '' 
The court reviewed the evidence in the cases of State 
v. Anderton, 81 Utah 320, 17 P. (2d) 917, and People v. 
Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94, in State v. Nemier, supra, 
and concluded that the evidence of prior crimes was 
admissible under an exception to the general rule, and 
stated that the evidence objected to was admissible as 
indicating a purpose or design to kill or do great bodily 
harm to anyone who attempted to interfere with the 
defendant's escape. 
In the case of State v. Nemier, supra, the evidence 
of the defendants' escape from the prison can be consist-
ently connected with the assault on the guards committed 
in connection with the escape and was no doubt one of 
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the elements which constituted the crime for which the 
defendants were on trial. 
It is respectfully submitted that the cross exami-
nation of the defendant as herein referred to and the 
inferences drawn therefrom by the District Attorney 
were matters incapable of proof, were not attempted 
to be proven, was not evidence of a similar offense and 
cannot be admissible to prove other similar offenses 
committed by the accused and did not tend to establish 
any of the necessary elements of the crime charged. 
v. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND·· 
ANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, SUCH 
MOTION HAVING BEEN DENIED AND SEN-
TENCE IMPOSED IN THE ABSENCE OF 
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT. (Specifica-
tion of Error Nos. VI, VII, VIII.) 
A motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and 
grant the defendant a new trial was filed on October 9, 
1951 (R. 338-339), and an order of the court sentencing 
the defendant and denying such motion was entered on 
October 16, 1951 (R. 340). Neither of defendant's coun-
sel was present when the motion was denied and sentence 
imposed, the record is silent as to the date of sentence 
or hearing on the motion for a new trial, and counsel 
for the defendant were not apprised of such hearing 
and date of sentence. 
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Article 1, Section 12, of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah provides in part : 
''In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel * * * to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the County or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been commit-
ted. * * *" 
Section 105-1-8, Laws of Utah 1943, provides: 
"Rights of defendant; (1) to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel.'' 
This court, in State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P. 
(2d) 1052, stated: 
"There is no doubt but that the constitutional 
right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel is a sacred right of one accused of crime 
which may not be infringed or frittered away, and 
·is one which may not be denied by the court or be 
waived by counsel.'' 
VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR A REHEARING OF DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN 
ORDER FOR AN EXAMINATION OF DESIG-
NATED PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. (Specification 
of Error, Nos. IX, X.) 
Defendant's motion for a rehearing on his motion 
for a new trial was filed on November 3, 1951 (R. 341), 
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and a motion for an order requ1nng examination of 
physical evidence received at the trial was filed on No-
vember 3, 1951 (R. 342). Both motions were supported 
by affidavits, one by counsel for the defendants, and the 
other by Ed Jackson, a member of the Salt Lake City 
police department. Both motions were by the court 
denied (R. 345-346). 
The theory advanced by the prosecution and argued 
to the jury was, among other things, that the defendant 
at the time of the shooting, had concealed in the auto-
mobile, presumably behind the front seat, the gun which 
was fired and caused the death of Officer Farley. No 
police officer at any time testified that the automobile 
had ever been searched, even though such was a fact and 
within the knowledge of the officers who had the auto-
mobile under constant surveillance for a long period of 
time. Officer Jackson, after the trial of the case and 
after the imposition of sentence and the denial of de-
fendant's motion for a new trial, disclosed such infor-
mation. 
During the course of the trial the coat worn by Of-
ficer Farley at the time of the shooting was introduced 
in evidence. Such coat contained a perforation with 
powder burns. The coat was taken by the jury at the 
time of their deliberation and was no doubt examined 
by the jury and influenced them in arriving at their ver-
dict. No evidence was offered by the State of a scientific 
character to establish the distance from which a shot 
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would have to have been fired to produce the powder 
burns on the coat worn by deceased. 
The affidavits were the basis of defendant's motion 
for a rehearing and defendant's motion for a new trial, 
which motion was by the court denied (R. 346). It is 
the contention of counsel for the defendant that the 
court erred in such denial, that the requests were not 
unreasonable and that the newly discovered evidence 
was a vital factor in determining the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. 
VII. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT 
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. (Speci-
fication of Error No. XI.) 
The jury was impaneled on October 2, 1951, and the 
trial proceeded throughout the day. On the evening of 
October 2nd there appeared in a local newspaper the 
names and addresses of the jurors, together with a state-
ment that police records show that the defendant was 
wanted for three robberies, a larceny, and on 47 counts 
of passing bad checks, for a robbery in Ogden and driving 
a stolen automobile across a state line. This was called 
to the attention of the court on the morning of October 
3, 1951, the court at that time informed counsel that if 
it was their desire the court would order a mistrial. 
Counsel did not request a mistrial and the court ad-
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Counsel does not at this late date complain of the 
action of the court that was acquiesed in. It is, however, 
a circumstance worthy of mention in connection with 
the contention of counsel that the defendant was denied 
the right to a fair and impartial trial. This incident, 
when taken into consideration and in connection with 
error argued herein, should be given consideration when 
a defendant has been convicted and sentenced to be 
executed for an offense which under the circumstances 
as disclosed by the evidence could not have been com-
mitted by him. 
It is submitted that the verdict of the jury and the 
sentence of the court should be set aside and the de-
fendant granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDW. M. MORRISSEY 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
arnd Appellant 
Receipt of copies of the above and foregoing Brief 
of the defendant and appellant acknowledged this ------------
day of J nne, 1952. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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